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INTRODUCTION 
My six-year-old half-Asian son has just had his first "Ching 
Chong Chinaman" taunting in school. I was expecting it, but it threw 
me off-balance nevertheless. He said it hurt his feelings and asked me 
for answers. I, of course, had none. I thought about what the 
appropriate response was for a six-year-old whose new consciousness of 
racism had begun to alter his vision of himself and the world around 
him irrevocably and forever. 
What struck me was that the continuum of possible motivations 
of the other taunting children-maliciousness, ignorance, imitation-was 
at that moment irrelevant. At that moment it did not seem appropriate 
to want my son to understand why some people would make him feel 
bad. That was not his responsibility. I merely wanted to comfort him 
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and to strengthen him, and all I could do was prepare him for the 
possibility of more. 
His Japanese American friend had once been excluded from a 
game by little white girls because she did 'not have blue eyes. In the 
world ofthe little white girls' parents to whom her father described the 
incident, the category of blue eyes had no racial content. To them it was 
an innocent child's category that just as easily could have been blue 
shoes. We parents of color all felt racial pain. And the little girl, for 
whatever the multiplicity of reasons, remained on the outside simply 
because of how she looked. I remember thinking then how white society 
has such an inability to see the world from any other perspective but 
that of a normative position. 
Lawyers deal in many fictions, not the least of which is that the 
law is a rational enterprise in which bias, experience, perspective, 
emotion, and politics form the vessel in which the law comes but do not 
define its essence. However, while people of color brace against an 
onslaught of political reaction, I write this Introduction to be freed as 
well from the fiction that legal scholars engage in solely rational 
discourse about neutral legal principles and societal norms-and that 
there is no highly charged political dynamic, sometimes irrational and 
always emotional, pulsating at the core of the discussion. 
Listening to my son, I thought once again how the themes upon 
which we academics so often pontificate-of race and multiculturalism, 
of how seemingly neutral rules have racial and gendered meanings-are 
not confined to the pages of sterile academic journals but are reenacted 
constantly in infinite ways for countless children in schoolyards across 
America. And that my son's, his friend's, his classmates', and my own 
racial world continue to be constructed in terms of hurt and resistance, 
self-doubt and affirmation; to be fanned by the flames that consumed 
100 black churches in the South; and to be mirrored in the roadside 
highway patrol beatings of Latino immigrants in California, in the 
killings of Chinese and Vietnamese for the crime of being a "Jap," in the 
secret slurs uttered in the corporate board rooms of oil companies, and 
in the legislation to beat back affirmative action, welfare, and 
immigration. All these are sanctified by a Supreme Court that names 
its lack of moral vision "colorblindness." 
In the final analysis, my academic musings and footnoted 
theorizing are really just worry-worry about the next time someone 
pulls up his eyes and mocks singsong pidgin to my children, or worse. 
* * * 
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A common understanding of what race is and why it matters 
becomes increasingly difficult to discern in the cacophony of America's 
racial discourse. Many scholars, particularly those associated with the 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) movement in legal scholarship, argue 
persuasively that whatever the consequences of its existence, the 
phenomenon of race itself is a social and legal construction. 1 That is, it 
is less a biological and apolitical condition than a conceptual mechanism 
by which power and privilege are allocated.2 Since the notion of race 
itself was constructed as a political device to keep people of color 
subordinated, progressive racial identity must be more than an 
acknowledgment of appearance and common ancestry. It also must 
include a common political outlook and agenda based upon a shared 
worldview that seeks freedom from that subordinated condition. 
This Article examines, within the context of Asian Pacific 
American identity, the notion that progressive political direction is the 
1. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, The End of Inrwcence or Politics After the Fall of the 
Essential Subject, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 687 (1996) [hereinafter Chang, End of Innocence]; 
Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 747 (1994); 
Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (KimberIe Crenshaw 
et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Critical Race Theory]; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our 
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Gotanda,A Critique]; 
Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American / Korean 
American Conflict: How We Constructed Los Angeles, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (1993); 
Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. 
Third World L.J. 225, 229 (1995) [hereinafter Wu, Neither Black nor White]. See also 
Tomas Almaguer, Racial Fault Lines, 205-06 (1994); Mary Coombs, Interrogating 
Identity, 2 Afr. Am. L. & Pol'y Rep. 222 (1995) (reviewing Judy Scales-Trent, Notes of a 
Black-White Woman: Race, Color, Community (1995»; Adrienne Davis, Beyond Black and 
White: Race-Conscious Policies and the "Other Minorities, .. 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 601 (1996); 
Ian F. Haney Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996); Angela P. 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990) 
[hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; Angela P. Harris, The Unbearable Lightness 
of Identity, 2 Afr. Am. L. & Pol'y Rep. 207 (1995) [hereinafter Harris, Unbearable 
Lightness]; Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the 
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 819 (1995) [hereinafter Lawrence, 
Foreword]; Lisa Lowe, Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American 
Differences, 1 Diaspora 24 (1991) [hereinafter Lowe, Heterogeneity]; Michael Omi & 
Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States 55 (1994). 
2. See Crenshaw et aI., Introduction, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at xiii. 
Critical race theorists are united by two common interests: (1) to show the relationship 
between white supremacy, subordination of people of color, and professed ideas such as 
''the rule oflaw" or "equal protection" and (2) to understand and change the bond between 
racial power and law. 
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fundamental content of racial identity. Part I will consider the 
construction of race by the larger society and the construction of counter 
racial identities by people of color. In particular, it will briefly review 
the const~ction of modern Asian Pacific American racial identity. I 
contend that contemporary pan-Asian Pacific American identity was 
originally constructed primarily not as an investigation, or even a 
celebration, of self, but as a political reaction to racial subordination, 
manifesting and articulating itself through specific positions concerning 
political events and issues. In that context, I argue that while there is 
no Asian American essentialized racial voice, the construction of 
contemporary pan-Asian Pacific American racial identity was and 
should continue to be the result of the process of forging political and 
ideological unity along more than racial grounds. In fact, some of the 
most vociferous objections to the construction of a politicized Asian 
Pacific American racial identity historically were voiced by other 
Asians. 
Unless the construction of racial identity by people of color 
continues to be a process of explicit opposition to ideologies of white 
supremacy in specific political struggles, there is a danger that the 
progressive content of racial identity will be eviscerated by the very 
forces that seek to maintain the status quo. Accordingly, Part II will 
consider the black/white paradigm critique from the standpoint of 
whether the inadequacy of America's racial vocabulary lies solely 
within the structure of the black/white paradigm or with the inability 
of courts and the dominant society to recognize the pervasiveness and 
effects of white supremacist ideology. The failure to articulate racial 
identity and consequently racial diversity specifically in political terms 
relating to antisubordination principles has led to an analytic 
incoherence. This incoherence has allowed neoconservative 
interpretations of multiculturalism and anti-essentialism to influence 
the terms of debate. Thus, Part II closes by looking critically at some of 
the constructions offered in the recent literature to replace the old 
paradigm, and warns that unless racial identity continues to be a 
conscious and explicit rejection of white supremacist ideology 
manifesting through specific political positions, it will be coopted by the 
very forces that seek to maintain the present racial status quo. 
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I. RACE CONSTRUCTION AND ASIAN AMERICANS 
If there is any growing sentiment among Asian American legal 
scholars, it is that race and racial identity are socially constructed.3 This 
conclusion has been reached not only by Asian Americans but by many 
others as well.4 While it is not the purpose of this article to rearticulate 
comprehensively the reasoning beyond the view that race is a social and 
political construct, it may be helpful to review the basic theses. 
A. Race as a Political Construction 
Constructed race is not simply a biological and immutable 
attribute such as phenotype or skin color, but "an unstable and 
'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly being transformed 
by political struggle.,,5 Moreover, it is a concept, albeit a powerful one, 
"which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by 
referring to different types of human bodies."s 
Professor Neil Gotanda has observed that "race is a socially 
constructed, human category, not a natural or scientific one.,,7 Indeed, 
the historical categorization of races in the United States has been 
arbitrary, fluid, and highly politica1,8 Thus, the meaning of race is 
3. See, e.g., Chang, End of Innocence, supra note 1; Gotanda, A Critique, supra 
note 1; Ikemoto, supra note 1; Lee, supra note 1; Wu, Neither Black nor White, supra note 
1. 
4. See, e.g., Almaguer, supra note 1; Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 1; 
Lopez, supra note 1; Omi & Winant, supra note 1. 
5. Omi & Winant, supra note 1, at 55. 
6. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
7. See Gotanda,A Critique, supra note 1. Thus, race "is not primarily about fidelity 
to an individual's lived experience, or a personal right to choose one's own labels; it is 
about a certain set of political and moral rights and obligations that are argued to arise 
from a certain history." Harris, Unbearable Lightness, supra note 1, at 222. Race is a 
"moral marker of wrongs that have been done and continue to be done" and, in essence, 
a political marker. Id. at 212. 
8. Gotanda reviews the creation of the racial category of Black (the "one drop of 
blood" rule of hypodescent), documents attempts to categorize those of mixed race such 
as "mulatto" (of mixed ancestry) or "named fractions" (assigned labels according to the 
fractional composition of racial ancestry such as a "quadroon"), and analyzes legislative 
classifications of race (the race of an offspring determined by a legislative formula). 
Gotanda, A Critique, supra note 1, at 23-36. 
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constructed by social context and has no fixed content itself.9 Racism 
cannot be ascertained apart from social context: 10 
[The] terrain of race has shifted between definitions of (1) race 
as biological characteristics, historical commonality, or 
essential identity, and (2) race as the erroneous categorization 
of people, or the false attribution of traits to people. Both 
definitions, however, locate race as an attribute within people 
rather than as a complex set of relations between peopleY 
A major underpinning of this approach is the observation that 
the construction of race in this country focuses on dichotomies. Race has 
been constructed as a relationship in which different groups are defined 
against one another.12 Whiteness becomes the "positive mirror image to 
the explicit negative identities imposed upon non-Whites.,,13 It becomes 
the "linchpin for the systems of racial meaning [and] . . . the norm 
around which other races are constructed."14 
For Critical Race theorists, the focus is consequently upon "how 
law was a constitutive element of race itself; in other words how law 
constructed race.,,15 According to CRT, racial power is 
the sum total of the pervasive ways in which law shapes and 
is shaped by "race relations" across the social plane. Laws 
produced racial power not simply through narrowing the scope 
of, say, anti-discrimination remedies, nor through racially-
biased decision-making, but instead, through myriad legal 
rules, many of them having nothing to do with rules against 
9. This is in contrast to a notion of racial "essentialism," which is the belief that 
there is a monolithic racial experience. See Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note l. 
The result of essentialism is to "reduce the lives of people who experience multiple forms 
of oppression to addition problems" and to "fragment experience into separate slices of 
lives." Id. at 588. Harris notes in a related context that feminist essentialism paves the 
way for unconscious racism since the "essentialist woman" turns out to be white. Id. at 
588-89. 
10. Lee, supra note 1, at 758. 
11. Id. at 75l. 
12. Lopez, supra note 1, at 165-67. According to Lopez, the construction of race is 
the construction of relationships. The relationship context creates a dualism-Whites or 
nonwhites-and allows races to be defined against one another by reference to what other 
races are and are not. [d. at 165-67. 
13. Id. at 167. 
14. Id. at 187. 
15. Crenshaw et al., Introduction, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at xxv. 
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discrimination, that continued to reproduce the structures and 
practices of racial domination.16 
53 
Although race is socially constructed and not an immutable 
biological characteristic, the effect of the phenomenon of race is 
nonetheless real.17 Moreover, the construction of racial identity is more 
than simply a group reaction to being "raced." As the construction of 
race itself is culturally and politically driven, so too is the creation of 
racial identity. The racial identity of peoples of color is formed in great 
measure as a reaction to the dominant group's construction of race and 
the effect of that domination upon the subordinated group. IS As such, 
racial identity has, at its core, a political character. That is, it is less a 
description of who one is and more a delineation of where one stands. 19 
The focus, then, of "identity politics" should be more on the content of 
the politics and less on the definition of identity.20 The task of 
constructing racial identity for people of color must be a means to bring 
16. Id. 
17. "[T)here is a material dimension and weight to the experience of being 'raced' 
in American society, a materiality that in significant ways has been produced and 
sustained by law." Id. at xxvi. Indeed, at the least sophisticated level of indicator-mere 
skin shade-research in Los Angeles has indicated that being born dark-skinned reduced 
the odds of working by 52%; 27% of dark-skinned Black men were unemployed, as 
compared with 20% of light-skinned Black men and 8.6% of white men; 19.4% of Black 
men with 13 or more years of schooling were unemployed, as compared with 10.3% of 
light-skinned Black men and 9.5% for white men; for men with less than twelve years of 
schooling, 61% of dark-skinned, 50% of light-skinned, and 18.6% of white men were 
unemployed. James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Race Still Matters, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, July 7,1995, at A48. 
Jayne Chong-Soon Lee also points out that theories that reduce racial identities 
to ethnic ones fail to account for the centrality of race in the histories of oppressed people, 
underestimate the degree to which traditional notions of race have shaped society, and 
may actually hinder the ability to resist entrenched forms of racism. Lee, supra note 1, 
at 771. 
18. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text. 
19. For purposes of this Article, I subsume antisubordination ideology under the 
broad umbrella of "politics." Indeed, an ideological framework influences one's political 
stances and since ideology is expressed in political terms, I have combined the two 
concepts for the sake of simplicity. In fact, I believe that the discovery and refinement of 
one's ideology is better done in the context of concrete political issues rather than in the 
abstractions of discussions about worldview. 
20. See Lee, supra note 1, at 770. Lee argues that by replacing racial reasoning with 
moral and political reasoning, ''we can start to move from a racial identity that is 
premised on our biology and racial essence to one that is based on our political stances." 
[d. 
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power to the disenfranchised, offer economic dignity to the poor, and 
give voice to the silenced. The political character of racial identity is, in 
part, a particular group's historically-situated reaction and opposition 
to white supremacist ideology and domination.21 
But perhaps more fundamentally, the construction of racial 
identity continues to invoke a common political understanding of the 
need to organize around common interests. In essence, the recognition 
and proclamation of racial identity-at least in the contemporary 
context of Asian Americans-was originally a means to a political end 
and not the end itself. Asian American "identity" was not meant to be 
a synonym for "heritage." It was a means to identify with others who 
shared the experience of subordination. Understanding and proclaiming 
one's heritage was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for building 
one's racial identity. 
In the introduction to their book Critical Race Theory, the 
editors, all major CRT scholars, articulate the notion that one of the 
areas of contemporary politics in which CRT might be influential "is the 
struggle' within communities of color over the future direction of 
antiracist politics.,,22 They rightly criticize the elevation of "racialism," 
an essentialist vision of group identity. This vision leads to a vulgar 
"representational politics" in which the experience of one may be 
considered representative of the experience of the groUp.23 While there 
is a multiplicity of experience among all people, even those sharing 
ethnic, racial, or gender traits, I contend that there also must be a 
21. See Gotanda, A Critique, supra note 1. Gotanda considers the treatment of race 
in a number of ways: status-race (inferior status of Blacks was accepted legal standard); 
formal-race (race as "neutral" attribute unconnected to social status or historical 
experience); historical-race (racial categories describe "reified systemic subordination" 
and relations of unequal power); culture-race (all aspects of culture, community, and 
consciousness-the link between cultural practices and subordination). Id. See also 
Coombs, supra note 1, at 222. Coombs interprets Gotanda as suggesting race is something 
more akin to culture or to a shared experience of racial oppression. Id. at 219-20. She 
notes that for some, racial identification is not "a set of shared physical characteristics," 
but the "shared experience of being visually or cognitively identified as black by a white 
racist society and the punitive and damaging effects of that identification." Id. at 226 n.18 
(quoting Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 Transition 30, 31 (1992». 
Coombs sees Scales-Trent advocating for conceptions of racial identity as a common 
culture or cultural phenomenon. Thus, blackness is defined as the experience of racial 
subordination, knowledge of African American culture, commitment to community, and 
loyalty to essential credos. Id. at 227. 
22. Crenshaw et aI., Introduction, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at xxx. 
23. Id. at xxxi. 
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coherent and "essential" political viewpoint for peoples of color. This 
political "essentialism" is a notion distinct from the authenticity of 
racial experience.24 In the search for an analytic framework that 
adequately takes account of the varying intersections of our individual 
, and group makeup, all experiences and points of view are authentic, 
and in that narrow sense, racially legitimate. However, the focus on 
" authenticity may blur the difference between what is "authentic" and 
what, in the end, is "authentically" beneficial in political terms for 
people of color. Clarence Thomas's claim to racial authenticity is an 
example of how depoliticized the discussion of what constitutes racial 
identity has become.25 
. Indeed, the critique of essentialism-ironically in concert with 
essentialism itself-may be indirectly responsible for the difficulties 
encountered when people of color act politically cohesively. The critique 
too often focuses attention on categories of difference and descriptions 
of unique circumstances rather than concentrating on a search for 
political commonality. American racial identity, at least for Asian 
Pacific Americans, lies in the collective resistance and reaction to white 
'society's similar racialization of distinctive Asian nationalities. 
'Moreover, Asian Pacific American identity has been most clearly 
expressed in the means by which we have organized ourselves to 
respond to the attempt to subordinate us. In short, political resistance 
to racial.oppression is the content of racial identity, and progressive 
people of color must reclaim the terms of the debate about what 
. constitutes it. Unless people of color unite to defeat its many 
manifestations, the "simple" bipolarity of dominance and subordination 
will prevail irrespective of sophisticated analytical attempts to define 
and delineate the multiple aspects of our individual identities. 
24. It is also distinct from what has been articulated as "strategic essentialism." See 
Lowe, infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
25. Crenshaw et aI., Introduction, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at xxxi 
, (The editors use Thomas to illustrate the consequences of a "vulgar racialism"-racial 
identity solely based upon superficial racial characteristics.); see also A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45 Hastings L.J. 1405 (1994) 
, (noting that Thomas votes consistently "against the best interests of the African 
. American community reveals a great deal about his sense of racial identity"); Lee, supra 
note 1, at 769 ("[W]hen racial identity is defined politically, as a firm commitment to 
antiracist struggles, Justice Thomas's claim to racial authenticity founders."). 
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B. The Historical Roots of the Construction of Asian American 
Identity 
There is no common American "Asian" culture per se. The 
American commonality of Asian Pacific Americans lies in the similar 
dangers to which they have all been exposed irrespective of ethnicity.26 
The strands of disparate Asian roots have been woven into the fabric of 
white supremacist stereotypes of Asians that are not particular to any 
Asian group, but cross ethnic lines.27 Moreover, Asian Pacific Americans 
have been taught about how to defend ourselves as a racialized minority 
by the experience of other racialized p~ople, particularly that of the 
African American community.28 The construction of an Asian Pacific 
American racialized identity adopted much from the struggles, lessons, 
26. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian 
Americans in a Society Obsessed With O.J., 6 Hastings Women's L.J. 165, 172 (1995) 
("[R)acial representations of Asian Americans, which range from ignorant and insensitive 
remarks to stereotypical portrayals of Asians, have the deleterious effect oflumping all 
Asians together as a group of people with similar characteristics, which in tum de· 
individualizes both Asians and Asian Americans."). 
27. Id. at 172-73. Asians, no matter how many generations in America, have 
historically been treated and assumed to be foreign and unassimilable. Even the famous 
dissent by Justice John Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which he posits a "colorblind" 
Constitution, removes "Chinamen" from the ambit of constitutional protection. 163 U.S. 
537 (1896). For a comprehensive treatment of Harlan's Plessy dissent in the context of 
his anti-Chinese jurisprudence in the body of his work, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy 
Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1997). The effect of 
stereotypes that have plagued Asian Americans historically revolves around an anti-
Asian sentiment that expresses itself at its most extreme by racist nativistic violence 
directed toward Asians irrespective of nationality and particularly in times of economic 
hardship or war. For a description of the historical treatment of Asians, including the 
racial implications of the Asian "model minority myth," see Chang, End of Innocence, 
supra note 1. See also Lee, supra note 26, at 171-81 (describing stereotypical racial 
representations of Asians). For a brief exploration of racial discrimination suffered by 
Asian Pacific Americans, including a critical look at the model minority stereotype, see 
Gabriel Chin et aI., Beyond SelfInterest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community 
of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action 13-23 (1996) [hereinafter Chin et aI., 
Beyond Self Interest). 
28. While definitions are arbitrary and often either over- or underinclusive, for the 
sake of simplicity, the term "Asian American" or "Asian Pacific American" refers to 
persons of Asian or Pacific Islander descent who live in the United States irrespective of 
their original place of birth. The term "African American" or "Black" refers to persons 
whose ancestry traces back to Africa-although there is some anthropological evidence 
that all of us may trace our ancestry back to Africa. "Latino/a" refers to persons who trace 
their ancestry back to Spanish-speaking Latin America. 
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and wisdom of the African American community's survival. 29 In fact, 
the construction of Asian American identity was itself only a byproduct 
of political organizing in the late sixties and early seventies around 
larger issues such as opposition to the Vietnam War or localized 
community struggles.30 
Glenn Omatsu, an early activist and now a staff member of the 
UCLA Asian American Studies Center, tells of attending an Asian 
American Studies class at UCLA. He describes how the professor had 
attributed the rise of Asian American racial consciousness to the efforts 
to secure civil rights during the 1960s and 1970s. Omatsu goes on: 
Young Asian Americans, the professor stated, were 
swept into this campaign and by later anti-war protests to 
assert their own racial identity. The most important influence 
on Asian Americans during this period was Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., who inspired them to demand access to 
policymakers and initiate advocacy programs for their own 
communities. Meanwhile, students and professors fought to 
legitimize Asian American Studies in college curricula and for 
representation of Asians in American society. The lecture was 
cogent, tightly organized, and well-received by the audience of 
students-many of them new immigrants and children of new 
immigrants. There was only one problem: the reinterpretation 
[of the context for the rise of Asian American racial 
consciousness] was wrong on every aspect. 
Those who took part in the mass struggles ofthe 1960s 
and early 1970s will know that the birth of the Asian 
American movement coincided not with the initial campaign 
for civil rights but with the later demand for black liberation; 
that the leading influence was not Martin Luther King, Jr., 
but Malcolm X; that the focus of a generation of Asian 
American activists was not on asserting racial pride but 
reclaiming a tradition of militant struggle by earlier 
generations; that the movement was not centered on the aura 
of racial identity but embraced fundamental questions of 
oppression and power; that the movement consisted of not 
only college students but large numbers of community forces, 
including the elderly, workers, and high school youth; and 
that the main thrust was not one of seeking legitimacy and 
29. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. 
30. [d. 
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representation with American society but the larger goal of 
liberation.31 
[29:47 
What is striking about Omatsu's description of the context of 
Asian American identity formation is that its beginnings had as the 
primary motivation a political direction distinct from an ethnic identity 
focus.32 That is, at its inception, the notion of Asian American identity 
was seen as a means of organizing other Asians for a larger political end 
rather than an end in itself. 
For example, Asian American organizing of opposition to the 
Vietnam War among other Asians crystallized around identification of 
the racial implications ofthe war-particularly when traditional antiwar 
31. Glenn Omatsu, The Four Prisons and the Movements of Liberation: Asian 
American Activism from the 1960s to the 1990s, in The State of Asian America 19, 20-21 
(Karin Aguilar-San Juan ed., 1994). Omatsu speaks from firsthand experience. I recall 
his political and community work in San Francisco's "J-Town" (Japantown) and with 
other activists from Chinatown in the early 1970s. 
The political roots of Asian American identity are also traced by Professor 
William Wei. See William Wei, The Asian American Movement (1993) [hereinafter Wei, 
AA Movement). Professor Wei undertakes one of the few looks at the national historical 
beginnings of the Asian American Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s and its 
effect on the construction of Asian American identity. My own personal recollections of 
some of the events he describes differ somewhat. For example, I recall the divergence of 
I Wor Kuen (IWK) and Asian Americans for Action (Triple A) as difficult at times, but not 
as acrimonious as Wei suggests; indeed, several ofthose who were sympathetic to IWK's 
formation were also founding members of the United Asian Community Center, along 
with other Triple A members. In addition, I disagree with what I perceive as Wei's "good 
guy reformers vs. bad guy revolutionaries" approach. Nevertheless, the book is significant 
in its scope, intent, and perspective. 
32. Wei describes the "Third World strikes" for ethnic studies at San Francisco 
State University and University of California Berkeley in 1968-1969 and the formations 
of the Asian American Political Alliances at those campuses, the formations of the Asian 
Community Center and later Wei Min She, the Red Guard and later I Wor Kuen in San 
Francisco Chinatown, the struggle to save the International Hotel in San Francisco, the 
creation of Asian Americans for Action, Asian Americans for a Fair Media, and Basement 
Workshop in New York City. For a description of these and other organizations see Wei, 
AA Movement, supra note 31, at 11-71. 
In addition, I recall the Japanese American Community Services, Asian 
American Hardcore, the Yellow Brotherhood, Gidra newspaper in Los Angeles, the 
creations of Asian Women United and the Organization of Asian Women in New York, 
and the Detroit Asian Political Alliance. I also recall significant early Asian American 
organizations in Stockton and Sacramento, California, as well as Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
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organizations were unwilling to address those issues.33 Other early 
Asian American community activists identified with the call of the 
Black Power movement's focus on social justice and community 
empowerment and began "serve the people" programs in Chinatowns, 
J-towns (Japantowns), and Manilatowns modeled on the Black Panther 
Party's community programs.34 Early activity also focused around labor 
organizing, health education, and housing.3s 
This focus was directly affected by one of the major political 
influences of the nascent Asian American Movement: the Black 
liberation movement, including Black nationalism. For the Black 
liberation movement of the 1960s and early 1970s "racial domination 
[was] located in the power relations between black and white 
communities in the exteriors of social life rather than in the interiors of 
consciousness.,,3G The way to eradicate racial domination was neither 
through social intercourse nor education, but through the direct 
33. Id. at 39-40. 
34. Id. at 208-17. Professor Wei locates the "serve the people" programs in another 
context-traditional social service agencies such as the Chinatown Planning Council in 
New York City. However, my recollection is that the "serve the people" concept was 
originally, directly, and self-consciously linked to the programs of the Black Panther 
Party, the Young Lords Organization, and the People's Republic of China. 
35. Id. In my experience, many discussions of Asian American identity tend to gloss 
over the fact that early community organizers, particularly those working in Chinatown 
and working with the Filipino community, dealt with how to address issues such as 
immigrants and immigration, communication between the foreign-born and the 
American-born, anti-communism, sweatshop organizing in the face of hostile 
management and unions, traditional antipathy of different Asian groups toward each 
other, and international issues. 
36. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at 
143-44. I must note here that I implicitly (and inaccurately) squeeze organizations like 
the Black Panther Party (BPP) under a "nationalist" umbrella. In fact, one of the true 
hallmarks of the BPP was its internationalist outlook and its attempt to translate the 
experience of socialist and other revolutionary movements into an American ideology 
irrespective of nationality or race. For many young Asian Americans, it was the BPP 
rather than the more strict Black nationalists that served as the role model. For example, 
I Wor Kuen modeled its newspaper and community/political program after the model of 
the Black Panthers and Young Lords. See Wei, AA Movement, supra note 31, at 213. 
Peller traces the history of the Black Nationalist movement's influence on race 
discourse. Group identity for the nationalists was a "voluntary willed association." Peller, 
supra, at 138. For nationalists, race was an organizing basis for group-consciousness and 
located differences between races in social history and "dissimilar conditions of life" in 
which "cohesive identity was achieved in the course of centuries of struggle against 
enslavement, cultural alienation, and the spiritual cannibalism of white racism." Id. at 
137-38 (quoting Dr. C. Mumford). 
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transformation of power relationships between blacks and whites.37 
Group solidarity was a mechanism to change power relationships, and 
the agenda included community economic power, governmental 
reparations, and community control of institutions such as police and 
schools.3s 
Pan-Asian American identification, thus, was constructed less 
as an expression of ethnic self-awareness than as a mechanism to 
organize Asians to address immediate as well as long-term political 
issues.39 Thus, ethnic identity was only one point of commonality-one 
of a number of bases of unity-among many others. For example, the 
power ofthe early organizing for Asian Americans lay in the realization 
that the racism inherent in the government's conduct of the war in 
Vietnam was reflected domestically within the different communities 
of Asian Americans. It was the recognition ofthis dynamic that marked 
the beginning of Asian American identity.40 
37. Peller, supra note 36, at 143-44. 
38. Id. at 145. 
39. This is not to minimize the profound effects of Asian American consciousness 
and the racial and ethnic awakening that resulted from Asians organizing around 
political and community issues. "[Alsian American consciousness was accompanied by a 
struggle to regain history, a struggle to tell our own stories, and to articulate our claim 
to rights in America. Through this process we have become, and are becoming, Asian 
Americans. This process is ongoing." Chang, End of Innocence, supra note 1, at 689. What 
I am suggesting is that one better sees and understands the effects of white supremacy, 
as well as homophobia, sexism, and other chauvinisms, upon one's self and one's people 
when it is understood in the larger context of its effects on society as a whole and when 
fought through concrete issues that affect the greater masses of people. 
Among the many Asian American grassroots groups that organize Asians 
around larger political issues are the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAV), 
which addresses police brutality, racial violence, labor ana refugee rights, and low-income 
community issues, and the Chinese Staff and Workers Association (CSWA), which 
organizes workers in the restaurant, construction, and garment industries. 
40. Indeed, international events and movements other than the Vietnam War 
helped spur the development of a political Asian American consciousness and identity 
that included identification with the emerging influence of the People's Republic of China, 
martial law in the Philippines, protest against security treaties between the United 
States and Japan, and the emergence of socialist countries and movements in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. 
Ornatsu traces the beginning of Asian American consciousness to the late 1960s, 
when Asian American activists attempted to involve people in the process of social 
change-confronting institutions of power and creating alternative visions based on these 
kinds of struggles. Omatsu, supra note 31, at 31. 
Omatsu cautions those of us who are academics that it is important that we 
focus not only on raising consciousness in the context of "study groups" but also within 
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C. Recent Approaches to Asian American Identity 
There have been a number of recent approaches to the notion of 
incorporating an explicit political component into racial identity.41 
Professor Robert Chang has suggested a movement away from 
essentialized identities and toward "subject positions.,,42 He advocates 
replacing "Asian American identity" with a larger political framework 
of a "people of color" racial identity.43 
the process of "involving people in the process of social change." Id. Indeed, Russell 
Leong's explicit advice (and warning) to academics is particularly apt: 
[We] must analyze the contradictions in our class analysis 
of others and own positioning in doing any theoretical work-be it 
around race relations, labor, class, literature or sexuality and gender. 
But the key word here is the work that needs to be done 
beyond articulation and analysis: that is, in assisting local struggles 
and international movements for social equality, political justice and 
cultural emancipation wherever they occur. Only through such 
hands-on work will we be able to humanize theory, and to bring a 
more committed theoretical dimension to our lives. 
Russell Leong, Liued Theory (Notes on the Run), in Thinking Theory in Asian American 
Studies, 21 Amerasia Journal v, x (Michael Omi & Dana Takagi eds., 1995). 
41. Robert Chang has pointed out that there is a "need to understand that identity 
is political, not essential." See his remarks in Paul Butler et aI., Conference: Race, Law, 
and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 567,627 
(Feb. 1996). Identity alone, with its "essentialist moorings," is inadequate for political 
growth. Chang, End of Innocence, supra note 1, at 690. For Chang, "coalitional politics, 
growing out of identity-based, interest-group politics, is an expansive form of identity 
politics .... Coalitions form and dissipate depending on political exigencies." Id. 
42. Chang defines "subject position" as part of a complex of social relations or social 
position and that each social agent is "the locus of many subject positions." Id. at 690-91 
(quoting Chantal Mouffe). Chang makes the point that "to say that you are a person of 
color becomes a political statement, a political act." Id. at 692. He articulates a number 
of possible political commitments that might help define the political content of racial 
identity, including antisubordination; political, economic, and cultural empowerment; 
uncompromising opposition to hetero-patriarchy; reconstructing the meaning and 
language ·of race; self-criticaVself-reflective approach; learning and openness to our 
histories; insistent commitment and identification with a subordinated race; weak link 
theory of social change; egalitarian deliberative participatory democracy; willingness to 
sacrifice and struggle; contextualized judgment and responsibility; and willingness to be 
disciplined as a group. Id. at 692 n.22. 
43. Id. at 692-93. According to Professor Chang, a "person of color" is an identity 
coming with certain political commitments such as antisubordination, political, economic, 
and cultural empowerment, and uncompromising opposition to hetero-patriarchy. Id. at 
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The problem with this conception is that an elimination of 
specific racial moorings and identities need not be a consequence of a 
political framework for viewing racial identity. It may not even reflect 
the reality of how the vast majority of the population of people of color 
see themselves. While race may be a construction, racial identity is not 
solely a product of cognitive and rational understanding. 
As Ian Lopez puts it, "[r]ace is only an idea, but it is an 
implacable one whose material effects pervade and predominate all 
social relationships.'*' Indeed, racial identity on broad "people of color" 
grounds alone may be impossible if racial identification is constructed 
as "culture-race,,,45 or "shared experience,,,46 or "dissimilar conditions 
of life.',47 Even from a day-to-day organizing standpoint, the ability to 
bridge across racial lines cannot be done simply because academics 
redefine what race is. If this new construction is still outside of people's 
daily lived experience, including that of people of color, it cannot 
succeed. 
691 n.22. 
44. Lopez, supra note I, at 169. 
45. See Gotanda, A Critique, supra note 1, at 56 ("Culture-race includes all aspects 
of culture, community, and consciousness. The term includes, for example, the customs, 
beliefs, and intellectual and artistic traditions of Black America, and institutions such as 
Black churches and colleges."). 
46. See Coombs, supra note I, at 225-26. Coombs suggests that if race is seen as a 
cultural phenomenon then experiences of racial subordination, of culture, and of 
commitment to community may figure primarily in determining race. Id. at 226. 
An article in the New York Times describes an emerging racial consciousness 
giving birth to pan-Asian clubs particularly in Queens, lower Manhattan, Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco. It reports that at the University of California and at Ivy League 
colleges, Asian-American clubs are increasingly organized around race rather than 
ethnicity. While most recent immigrants in Queens, New York remain divided by 
ethnicity and nationality, "the older immigrants and their children mix and identify 
racially with one another." Norimitsu Onishi, New Sense of Race Arises Among Asian-
Americans, N.Y. Times, May 3D, 1996, at AI. A similar phenomenon has been reported 
among Latinos in certain sections of Queens where different Spanish-speaking cultures 
intermingle. A Latino sociology professor is quoted as saying the residents "are creating 
a true American culture, with ingredients from everywhere in Latin America and a large 
dose of elements from the United States .... They have shed some of their national quirks 
to come together under a Hispanic banner." Mirta Ojito, More Spanish Accents, But Fewer 
Are Cuban, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1997, at BI. 
47. See Peller, supra note 36, at 138 ("The depth of identification of self and 
recognition of others implicit in the idea of nationhood based on generations of 'dissimilar 
conditions of life' marks a vision of community that cannot be captured in the liberal 
dichotomies of either liberty/coercion or reason/myth."). 
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It is only through the dynamic process of effectuating actual 
political change that people of color can define ourselves more clearly.48 
But as all who have struggled to hold coalitions together know, "[w]e 
cannot build coalitions if we have not created safe places for the equally 
difficult and important work that families do.'>49 The need to build broad 
identities to encompass broad political ends need not be counterpoised 
to a sense of unique racial identity; both can serve each other. American 
society and certainly people of color need a unified community of color 
as much as a progressive Asian Pacific American identity. Asian Pacific 
Americans need to help build both.50 
"Asian American identity" also has been conceptualized as a 
political unity that enables diverse Asian groups to understand similar 
unequal circumstances and historical treatment and that empowers the 
heterogeneous community to confront institutions that marginalize US.51 
"Strategic essentialism" envisions a constructed unity assumed for 
political reasons for "the purpose of contesting and disrupting 
discourses that exclude Asian Americans while simultaneously 
revealing the internal contradictions so as to insure that such 
essentialisms will not ultimately strengthen the apparatuses that 
Asians seek to dis-empower.,,52 
48. The pronoun "we" is used to denote either "Asian Pacific American" in a 
particular sense, and people of color in a more generalized sense since I believe the 
interests are fundamentally congruent. Indeed, "we" also encompasses the notion of all 
Americans since the construction of progressive racial identity will have a profound 
impact upon how we see ourselves as Americans. 
49. Lawrence, Foreword, supra note 1, at 839-40 (1995). Professor Lawrence 
addresses the issue of multicultural anti-racist struggle as an analog to the struggles 
against apartheid. He states that using this theory to address interminority conflict will 
not succeed until the focus is placed upon the eradication of white supremacy. "If our legal 
system fails to address the emerging problem ofinterminority group conflict, it is because 
it has failed to address the continuing legacy of American apartheid." Id. at 826. 
50. Professor Chang recognizes the inherent difficulty of coalitional politics based 
solely on essentialized identity politics. See Chang, End of Innocence, supra note 1, at 690. 
However, when there is unity about the politics inherent in racial identity, then 
coalitional unity is based upon more than just essentialized concerns. That is, splits that 
may occur around immigration or affirmative action will reflect a differing political 
analysis of how to eradicate white supremacist ideology and its effects-the real "interest" 
of us all in the long term. On that basis the division will not be on solely racial grounds. 
51. Lowe, Heterogeneity, supra note 1, at 30. 
52. Id. at 39. 
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While this view accurately acknowledges that gender, class, 
sexual orientation, and other differences will enhance Asian American 
unity with other groups, the commonality still stems from self-identity, 
not political identity.53 However, the purpose of Asian heterogeneity 
must be more than the "empowerment" of the community to engage 
institutions that marginalize us. Such a purpose alone is inadequate 
because it fundamentally begs the question of what the goal of the 
"empowerment" is.54 
This distinction may be illustrated in the protest against the 
Broadway production of Miss Saigon. During the production of the 
musical, a controversy arose around two major issues: (1) the casting of 
white actors playing Asian characters and (2) the play's perpetuation 
of common Asian stereotypes (Asian women as prostitutes, Asian men 
as faceless subhumans).55 However, there was a political disjunction in 
the focus of the protest against the play. Some protested the 
perpetuation of stereotypes within the piece, suggesting that plays such 
53. According to Lowe, since the most exclusive construction of Asian American 
identity presumes masculinity, American birth, and speaking English, this construction 
is at odds with forming political alliances across other lines and thus, the 
acknowledgment of gender and class differences among Asian Americans strengthens our 
ability to affiliate with other groups. [d. at :31. Thus, the freedom "to explore the 
hybridities is permitted by the context of a strongly articulated essentialist politics." [d. 
at 39. A politics based exclusively on ethnic identity "accepts the terms of the dominant 
logic that organizes the heterogeneous picture of racial and ethnic diversity into a binary 
schema of 'one' and 'the other ... · [d. at 30. Moreover, it risks underestimating differences, 
inadvertently supporting the racist discourse that we are all alike. [d. 
In another context, Lowe also emphasizes the dangers of ignoring the tension 
and conflicts among ethnic and racial groups since through the exploration of the 
contradictions, "we begin to address the systemic inequalities built into cultural 
institutions, economies, geographies .... " Lisa Lowe, Imagining Los Angeles in the 
Production of Multiculturalism, in Mapping Multiculturalism 413, 421 (Avery F. Gordon 
& Christopher Newfield eds., 1996). 
54. Lowe describes how the need to protect immigrant communities has generated 
projects that "exemplify how theory and practice are synthesized in work that is both 
activist and intellectual." Lisa Lowe, On Contemporary Asian American Politics, 21 
Amerasia Journal 41, 47-48 (1995) [hereinafter Lowe, On Contemporary). New projects 
concretely addressing the political realities of Asian immigrant communities also take on 
"the difficult work of forging understanding and political understanding between very 
heterogenous Asian and non-Asian groups." [d. at 48 (describing how the organizing of 
Asian immigrant women to assist in documenting exploitative working conditions in 
certain San Diego industries created solidarity with female Mexican workers). 
55. Miss Saigon is an adaptation, set in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, of 
Puccini's opera Madama Butterfly. 
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as this were racially offensive and inappropriate for production. 56 
Others protested by taking the position that there should have been 
more Asian actors in more meaningful roles in the play, suggesting that 
the stereotypical characters were not an issue so long as Asians played 
them. 57 While the issue of equal employment for Asian actors is not 
separate from the dearth of non-stereotypical roles, the immediate goals 
of the "empowered" heterogeneous Asian Pacific American community 
protesting Miss Saigon in a real sense were fundamentally at odds. 
Both Chang and Lowe instruct us that identity is rooted in 
politics, and articulate the foundational notion that racial solidarity "is 
56. For a description of the events surrounding the protests and of the leadership 
role that gay and lesbian Asian Americans played in articulating this view, see Yoko 
Yoshikawa, The Heat Is On Miss Saigon Coalition, in The State of Asian America 275 
(1994). 
57. This was the position originally held by Actors' Equity after protests by the 
playwright David Henry Hwang and actor B.D. Wong (Actors' Equity later reversed its 
position). See, e.g., Shirley Sun, Why the Furor Over Miss Saigon Won't Fade: For Asians 
Denied Asian Roles, 'Artistic Freedom' Is No Comfort, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at B7; 
Alex Wichel, Union Weighs Miss Saigon Casting, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at C12. 
Hwang and Wong were subsequently honored by the Association of Asian Pacific 
American Artists for raising the casting issue. See David J. Fox, Kurosawa Cited For 
Career Achievement, Awards: An Actor and Playwright Who Raised Issue of 
Discrimination in Casting Also Will Be Honored By Asian Pacific American Artists 
Association, L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 1991, at F2. For another description of events 
surrounding Miss Saigon, see Wei, AA Movement, supra note 31, at 52-54. 
Neil Gotanda discusses Miss Saigon in the context of how racism affects Asian 
Americans-how the model minority image "carries an implied racial context of racial 
stratification and that there are distinct ideological messages implicit within the model 
minority image and racial stratification." Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the 
"Miss Saigon Syndrome," in Asian Americans and the Supreme Court 1087, 1088 
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). The ideological message is articulated as follows: 
Under the model of racial stratification ... the economic disparities 
between Black and White ... do not appear to be a genuine social 
problem. The presence of more successful Asian Americans and 
Latinos, located between Whites and African Americans, proves that 
the social and economic barriers can be overcome and are not rooted 
in "race." Thus racial stratification serves to justify and legitimate 
existing racial disparities. 
id. at 1091. For further discussion of the use of multiracialism in the context of a new 
American racial hierarchy, see Chris K Iijima, Political Accommodation and The Ideology 
orthe "Model Minority": Building a Bridge To White Minority Rule in the 21st Century, 
S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. (forthcoming). 
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the product of [political, moral and ethical] struggle.',s8 However, racial 
solidarity must be created not' only between and among races, but 
within races as well. Racial solidarity is also a product of political and 
moral struggle. It is not a struggle simply over ideas in the abstract. 
Affecting masses of people, it is a struggle that occurs over concrete 
political tasks and issues. The progressive power of racial solidarity is 
not rooted in similarity of phenotype, but in shared political agenda. It 
is no accident that the first stirrings of Asian American identity were 
in the context of protests against other Asians. The immediate objects 
of early self-conscious Asian American protest and thus the unity of 
early Asian American activists was based less around ethnic and racial 
background than common political go~ls and worldview.s9 
Omatsu describes a major difference in the focus of Asian 
American political organizing as the years progressed. He notes that the 
early focus of Asian American community activists was on the 
disenfranchised of the community-youth, addicts, prisoners, tenants, 
and low-income workers. More recent "identity politics" focuses on the 
"empowerment" of young Asian American professionals. The results of 
this change in focus and the subsequent entrance of Asian American 
neoconservatives into "identity politics," according to Omatsu, "helps 
explain the political ambiguity of Asian American empowerment in the 
late 1980s.,,60 The notion of Asian American identity has moved from an 
expressly progressive political framework into one based upon perceived 
ethnic and racial commonalities. If that understanding remains the 
content of Asian Pacific American identity politics, then it cannot 
58. Chang, End of Innocence, supra note 1, at 692 (quoting Angela P. Harris, 
Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 741,784 (1994»; see also 
Lowe, On Contemporary, supra note 54. 
59. In fact, I recall early Asian American activists were often criticized by 
conservatives in their respective Asian American communities for "rocking the boat," for 
"embarrassing the community," and, of course, for "being communists." Early objects of 
Asian Pacific American protests were the Six Companies in Chinatown, the president of 
San Francisco State University, S.1. Hayakawa, and the Japanese American Citizens 
League. See Wei, AA Movement, supra note 31. I recall that one of the most profound 
moments of Asian American consciousness raising was at the national convention of the 
Japanese American Citizen's League in Chicago in 1970 where a group of Asian American 
activists from both the East and West Coasts met to plan a demonstration against the 
conservative forces in the JACL and to "convince" the organization to oppose the Vietnam 
War. For a similar perspective on that convention, see William Minoru Hohri, Repairing 
America: An Account of the Movement for Japanese-American Redress 37-38 (1988). 
60. Omatsu, supra note 31, at 40-42. 
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coherently address concrete contemporary political issues such as 
affirmative action or welfare and immigration reform. This incoherence 
arises in part because ethnic commonalities among Asian Pacific 
Americans by themselves seem so difficult to articulate.61 The direction 
to follow in the reconstruction of Asian Pacific American identity is best 
expressed by Omatsu, who admonishes that Asian Pacific American 
identity must continue to be built within the context of broad political 
analysis: 
Thus, as we approach the end of the twentieth century, 
activists are confronted with a task similar to that confronting 
activists in the late 1960s: the need to redefine the Asian 
American experience. And as an earlier generation discovered, 
redefining means more than ethnic awakening. It means 
confronting the fundamental questions of power and 
domination in U.S. society.62 
The failure to centralize the overarching political context and 
nature of identity construction can lead and has led to an incoherence 
in critiques of race definition and race relations. Moreover, the failure 
to set a progressive political framework for the discussion of racial 
identity has altered the terms of the debate surrounding race, and has 
allowed space for neoconservative articulations of race construction to 
61. See, e.g., David Mura, A Shift in Power, A Sea Change in the Arts, in The State 
of Asian America 183, 197 (1994) ("What do we [Asian Americans] have in common except 
for racism and rice?" (quoting Valerie Lee, Director of the Asian American Renaissance 
Conference, 1992». 
62. Omatsu, supra note 31, at 65. It is notable that Michael Omi and Dana Takagi 
observe: 
The waning of radical political movements in the 1980s had attendant 
effects on theory and politics within Asian American Studies. We feel 
that the absence of a sustained and coherent radical theory of social 
transformation led to a retreat to more mainstream, discipline-based 
paradigmatic orientations. Contributing to this trend was the 
increasing ''professionalization'' of the field in academic settings, the 
demands for tenure and promotion for faculty members, and the 
entrance of newcomers in the field trained in specific disciplines who 
had not participated in the new social movements of the previous 
decades. 
Michael Omi & Dana Takagi, Introduction: Thinking Theory in Asian American Studies, 
21 Amerasia J. xi, xiii (1995). 
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confuse the discussion.63 This confusion is evident in the contemporary 
critique of the black/white paradigm upon which American racial 
vocabulary has been largely articulated. 
II. THE BLACKiWHITE PARADIGM AND ITS CRITIQUE 
The question of whether racial identity contains implicit 
political identities has become an even more important issue given the 
changing demographics of American society. Confusion about the 
content and implications of racial positioning will serve only to reinforce 
the present racial status quo. In the United States, a bipolar 
black/white paradigm of race relations has been the framework upon 
which a vocabulary has been erected to deal with race issues.64 As 
immigration has changed the demographics of American society over 
the last thirty years, and as African Americans have decreased as a 
percentage of America's population of color, legal scholars have taken 
an increasingly critical look at the old black/white paradigm and found 
it wanting.65 In crucial areas-affirmative action, interracial conflict in 
the inner city, redistricting-the players are not simply black and white 
but a panoply of races and interests.66 
63. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 145, 155 (1994) (arguing that 
Asians do not respond monolithically to their common legacy of discrimination). For a 
discussion of Chen's article see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. 
64. More particularly, race has been constructed as a black/white paradigm in 
which race is analyzed solely as an operation of either blackness or whiteness. See Robert 
S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1241, 1265-67 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chang, Legal Scholarship)' It is interesting to note that even mainstream popular 
publications criticize the "binary approach to race" as being "no longer relevant to the 
nation's changing demographics." Tom Morganthau, What Color Is Black?, Newsweek, 
Feb. 13, 1995, at 62. Adrienne Davis traces the paradigm to the case of Hudgins v. 
Wright, in which women claimed being of free Native American ancestry rather than of 
Black ancestry, and thus brought suit against being owned as slaves. 11 Va. (Hen. & M.) 
134 (1806). See Davis, supra note 1, at 615; see also Coombs, supra note 1, at 225. 
65. See Almaguer, supra note 1, at 2; Chang, Legal Scholarship, supra note 64, at 
1265-68; Frank Wu, Neither Black nor White, supra note 1, at 248; see also Morganthau, 
supra note 64, at 62 (commenting that the "binary approach toward race is no longer 
relevant to the nation's changing demographics-immigrants and multiracials"); Stanley 
Crouch, Race Is Over, N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 9, 1996, at 170 (discussing the 
increasing influence of mixed race and culture in contemporary American society). 
66. Alexandra Natapoff, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of 
Interminority Group Conflict, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1995). 
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Many scholars of color criticize the old paradigm because it 
cannot adequately account for the "new" players in the scenario.67 
Critics of the old paradigm note that it cannot even adequately consider 
class, gender, or any other identity that intersects with race. In fact, 
some say it fails in fundamental ways to address the growing 
phenomenon of multiracial identities.6a 
Yet the process of de constructing the old black/white paradigm 
carries with it new dangers. Although narrowly constructed, it has had 
real value for those wishing to raise issues of white supremacy and the 
subordination of people of color. The original paradigm, while 
constructing and reaffirming white dominance, also permitted a useful 
counter-focus on the effect and operation of white supremacy. While 
progressive scholars and activists agree that the black/white paradigm 
must be dismantled to make room for more sophisticated and nuanced 
models, the focus on the effects of white supremacist ideology must 
remain at the core of the analysis. Academics and legal scholars, as well 
as popular media, are addressing the issue of whether the traditional 
bipolar black/white paradigm of race relations is a coherent 
framework. 69 
American society has never been strictly black and white. 
Indeed, the "multiracialness" of America is no new phenomenon. 
"Black" has, in fact, long been a multiracial, multi-hued color:70 
Even on its own terms, race has never been a black and white 
matter. There have always been as many shades of black and 
brown as there have been individuals who identified 
themselves or were identified by others, by that concept. 
There have always been Native Americans, Chicanos, and 
Asian immigrants. In an earlier era, the various white ethnic 
groups were considered to be distinct races.71 
One of the pernicious effects of the old paradigm has been the 
creation of an incoherent positioning of racial groups with respect to one 
another. In Los Angeles, during the uprising after the Rodney King 
67. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
68. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and 
White Anymore, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1995). 
69. For a list of scholars who have addressed this issue see supra note 1. 
70. It should be noted that the plaintiff in the famous case of Plessy v. Ferguson 
was seven-eighths white by blood. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
71. Wu, Neither Black nor White, supra note 1, at 251. 
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verdict, there was much analysis of the conflict between the Korean 
American and African American communities that emerged in the 
disturbance.72 It is significant to note that in the construction of the 
conflict, nativist arguments that Koreans were foreigners and less 
American positioned African Americans as "white" relative to Asians.73 
On the other hand, Korean Americans were also placed within the 
entrepreneurial American Dream and positioned as white.74 This kind 
of positioning becomes coherent only if the assumptions of the old 
paradigm and the placement of whiteness within it are accepted as the 
operating framework. 75 Moreover, the racialization of identity within 
this bipolarity submerges class and gender, while essentializing race.76 
The black/white paradigm has also forced other marginalized 
groups to distinguish themselves from black people in order to avoid 
being treated as poorly: 77 
The black white paradigm is an intriguing piece of 
white supremacy. Although I am black, I will not defend it 
because black people certainly didn't set up this 
paradigm .... [But) this paradigm has force. Other people of 
color have tried to argue their differences from black 
Americans so they won't be treated like black Americans. 
Legally, it's a perfectly defensible strategy. 
72. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 1; see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other 
Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean And African 
Americans, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15 (1993). 
73. Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1587-91. Ikemoto describes the white supremacist 
"master narrative" of the conflict between the groups as "Asians are foreign intruders" 
and "African Americans are Blacks who are criminals and poor." Id. at 1582-83. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1591. In the essentialized race conflict Korean becomes Asian becomes 
merchant in opposition to constructed Blackness becomes poor becomes criminal, and 
filters out possible bases of understanding. Id. at 1592-93. Indeed, as Lowe pointedly 
articulates, "[tlhroughout our lived social relations, it is apparent that labor is gendered, 
sexuality is racialized, and race is class-articulated." Lowe, On Contemporary, supra note 
54, at 46. 
77. See Wu, Neither Black nor White, supra note 1, at 249 ("Racial groups are 
conceived as white, black, honorary whites, or constructive blacks."); see also Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (definition of "white person" under naturalization 
statute did not include the Japanese); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (statute 
prohibiting "blacks" from testifying against ''whites'' included Chinese); Hudgins v. 
Wright, 11 Va. (Hen. & M.) 134 (1806) (Native American bringing suit against being 
owned as a slave on the basis that she was not black). 
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Unfortunately, in the current political context, it's had some 
really detrimental effects particularly as far as doing cross-
culturalorganizing.78 
71 
The critique of the black/white paradigm has had some ironic 
effects. To the extent that the paradigm has forced people of color to 
disassociate from African Americans in a legal context, the modem 
critique of it has also led to problematic constructions of racial identity 
which submerge a critical focus on white supremacy. 
For example, there is increasing focus on the complex problem 
of how to classify diverse and complex racial identities and how to 
negotiate the differences between groups of color. Simultaneously, there 
is a tendency to lose focus on the endpoint of the classification and the 
eradication of the root of the differences: white racial privilege and 
white supremacist ideology.79 
One critique ofthe old paradigm constructs race as entirely self-
defined. The most obvious example of such an approach is in the recent 
push for a "multiracial" category in the official U.S. census.so This vision 
is based on the demographic changes that have affected the focus of race 
relations: increasing percentages of people of color, increasing numbers 
of non-black persons of color, increasing numbers of people who consider 
themselves multiracia1.81 Thus, it searches for a framework for 
constructing racial identity that includes "other factors that shape 
78. See Adrienne Davis, Remarks at the Conference on Color-blindness versus 
Racial Justice (Sept. 21, 1995), in Paul Butler et al., Conference: Race, Law and Justice: 
The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 Amer. U. L. Rev. 567 (1996). 
79. See, e.g., Tanya Hernandez, Multiracial Category May Address Only Fear, N.Y. 
Times, July 15, 1996, at A10 (letter to editor) ("[T]he demand for a multiracial category 
should be carefully examined in view of the politics of race and the ways in which a 
separate class can be used as a tool of subordination rather than as a demonstration of 
respect for the diversity of our nation."). 
80. See, e.g., Associated Press, Rally Seeks To Add Multiracial Category on U.S. 
Census Forms, L.A. Times, July 21, 1996, at A4. Of course, the irony of this approach is 
that it assumes and validates the existing ways that "pure" races have been constructed. 
See Lopez, supra note 1, at 161-62. Recently, a federal task force recommended that an 
individual of mixed racial parentage be able to self-identify and check off several races 
simultaneously on federal demographic forms. See Steven A. Holmes, Panel Balks at 
Multiracial Census Category, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1997, at A12 (reporting that while seven 
states have a multiracial category and nine other states are considering the issue, a 
federal task force will recommend not to include a multiracial category on federal forms 
but will recommend the multiple check-off option). 
81. See Ramirez, supra note 68. 
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[one's] sense of self."s2 This new multicultural paradigm rests upon an 
individual's self-definition. It "rests upon universal principles of 
individuality, instead of race or ethnicity."s3 This self-definition 
"counters the depersonalizing effects of imposed racial classifications,"84 
making "color consciousness ... a matter of individual choice."s5 
However, racial identity is not simply a question of a particular 
individual's self-definition.s6 It is a function of being "raced" 
82. Id. at 975. 
83. Id. at 986. Ramirez proposes a "multicultural empowerment" as a new 
paradigm. Id. at 960. This new paradigm would "acknowledge the importance of race, yet 
penetrate beyond race" to identifY and incorporate problems that cannot be solved solely 
through racial preferences. Id. According to this vision, multicultural empowerment 
rectifies a binary remedial system for which it was never designed-"balancing competing 
claims among people of color and finding a place for multicultural identity within the 
remedial scheme." Id. at 992. 
Professor Ramirez makes the important point that something more than racial 
identification is necessary to unite people of color. Indeed, she poses the fundamental 
question whether the interests of poor Latinos are any different from those of poor 
African·Americans or Asian Americans. Deborah Ramirez, Forging A Latino Identity, 9 
La Raza L.J. 61, 67 (1997). She searches for the model "that allows us to empower 
ourselves without creating barriers among and between groups." Id. I submit that the 
fundamental interest within, among, and between racial groups is our commitment to the 
eradication of privilege-race, gender, class, sexual orientation-and that this interest 
must become a component part of how we define our particular racial identities. 
84. Ramirez, supra note 68, at 981. 
85. Id. at 986. In Ramirez's hypothetical admissions plan, race-based questions are 
replaced by open-ended questions that "enable students to construct their own profile." 
In this hypothetical, a school may ask if a prospective student is a member of a group that 
has been historically disadvantaged and whether a student has "actively associated with 
disadvantaged communities." Id. at 979-80. Under this system a "non-Hispanic white 
whose life had been devoted to advocacy on behalf of Alaskan native tribes" would be 
evaluated similarly to a "Latino low-income housing advocate or a black community 
development activist." Id. at 980. 
86. See Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect 
Categories Yield Correct Information? 15 Law & Ineq. J. 83, 97 (1997) ("Regardless of how 
truly one is able to express one's personal identity, structural racism in U.S. society will 
persist in forcing people into one of the five boxes of the racial/ethnic pentagon for the 
foreseeable future .... "); see also Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 
Asian L.J. 185, 204-05 (1996) [hereinafter Wu, From Black to White] ("Asian Americans 
may be able to assert that they are not black in order to be accepted as white [but they] 
should not be so foolish, however, as to believe that they can really exercise their 
individual decision or even their collective choice."). 
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independently by the dominant society, and it is also fundamentally an 
issue of group political empowerment.87 
Since the construction of race may be viewed as the construction 
of relationships, the construct creates a dualism: whites or nonwhites.sa 
87. Moreover, in most affirmative action contexts, people of color must rely on 
predominantly white faculty and administrators who make in a closed and 
unrepresentative process determinations about which people of color are "worthy" of 
inclusion for diversity purposes. See Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke To The Wall: The Crisis of 
Bakkean Diversity, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 881, 934-35 (1996). Indeed, Chin 
raises the possibility that schools may admit "preferred racial minorities" to the exclusion 
of those not ·'preferred." [d. at 936. That possibility is why it is crucial that racial 
diversity and racial identity not be solely defined as an issue of an individual's racial or 
cultural experience. Given that the actual affirmative action determinations are going to 
be made by whites, the terms of what constitutes racial identity and therefore, racial 
diversity, must be more definitively political and grounded in antisubordination 
principals. 
88. Lopez, supra note I, at 165-67. This dualism is present in the construction of 
other identities as well. David Halperin discusses the dualism inherent in the 
heterolhomosexual binarism: 
The heterosexuallhomosexual binarism is itself a homophobic 
production, just as the man/woman binarism is a sexist production. 
Each consists of two terms, the first of which is unmarked and 
unproblematized-it designates the "category to which everyone is 
assumed to belong" {unless someone is specifically marked as 
diiferent}-whereas the second term is marked and problematized: it 
designates a category of persons whom something differentiates from 
normal, unmarked people. The marked (or queer) term ultimately 
functions not as a means of denominating a real or determinate class 
of persons but as a means of delimiting and defining-by negation and 
opposition-the unmarked term .... Heterosexuality defines itself 
without problematizing itself, it elevates itself as a privileged and 
unmarked term, by abjecting and problematizing homosexuality. 
Heterosexuality, then, depends on homosexuality to lend it 
substance-and to enable it to acquire by default its status as a 
default, as a lack of difference or an absence of abnormality. 
David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards A Gay Hagiography 44 (1995) (emphasis in 
original) (footnotes omitted). 
There is a danger in conceptualizing race in terms of relationships since it 
creates an illusion that racial identities possess an internal stability when in actuality 
racial construction is complex because of the heterogeneity of society. Lopez, supra note 
I, at 165-66. A binary construction of race distorts the ways in which nonwhite races are 
racialized against each other and produces "an inherently incoherent system of racial 
meanings that distorts and hides the underlying heterogenous reality of life in U.S. 
society." [d. at 166-67. 
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This dualism allows races to be defined against one another.89 
Whiteness has been defined within this "diacritical system as a positive 
mirror image to the explicit negative identities imposed upon non-
whites."oo Thus, "[w]hiteness continues to exist primarily as an identity 
constructed in opposition to that [identity] imposed upon racial 
minorities .... "91 It exists as the norm around which other races are 
constructed.92 
An analogy might be made to the binary construction of 
"homosexuality," defined negatively and oppositionally as everything 
"heterosexuality" is not.93 But the development of "queer politics" has 
made available a new kind of identity "constituted not substantively but 
oppositionally, not by what it is but by where it is and how it 
operates.,,94 
A similar framework always has been at work for people of 
color. The old black/white paradigm was useful for identity construction 
and day-to-day political organizing. The paradigm's utility lay in the 
transformation ofthe marginality of people of color's existence outside 
the "norm" into an organizing force to advocate for political positions in 
opposition to those found in the "normal" discourse.95 The old paradigm 
at least allowed a reverse discourse to develop in which the object to be 
considered was whiteness and white supremacy from the normative 
position of color.96 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 167. 
91. Id. at 171. 
92. Id. at 187. Indeed, its existence depends upon the mythologies that sustain the 
current racial system, and its maintenance requires the "conceptual existence of Blacks, 
Latinos, Native Americans, and other races as tropes of inferiority against which 
Whiteness can be measured and valued .... Racial equality may well be impossible until 
Whiteness is disarmed." Id. 
93. See Halperin, supra note 88, at 44. Lopez similarly notes that "colored" is 
defined by negation and opposition as everything whiteness is not. See Lopez, supra note 
1, at 167. 
94. Halperin, supra note 88, at 61-62. 
95. Halperin describes "queer politics" as the ability to define sexual identity 
"oppositionally and relationally but not necessarily substantively, not as a positivity but 
a positionality, not as a thing but as a resistance to the norm." Id. at 66. 
96. Professor Leonard M. Baynes has observed that even if the dominant paradigm 
is not black/white as a matter of race, the effects of racial subordination occur 
predominant within a "darkllight" paradigm as a matter of shade even within "non-
Black" communities such as Latino. See Leonard M. Baynes, Even If It Is Not Just Black 
and White Anymore, Darkness Casts A Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness: 
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A. Racial Conflict Among People of Color and Whites As "Victims" 
Self-definition cannot resolve conflicts between different people 
of color because racial conflict is not primarily rooted in how we as 
individuals see ourselves with respect to race. It is rooted in how groups 
have been pitted against one another. The resolution of conflict between 
races can be resolved only when we understand how the ideology of 
white supremacy has been internalized by all people-particularly 
people of color. In essence, intergroup conflict can be best understood as 
the product of internalized white supremacy.97 As Charles Lawrence 
cogently observes: 
If our bipolar, black/white model for thinking about racial 
inequality is dysfunctional in a multiracial society it is 
because it is a model that never worked in the first place, even 
when most Americans who were not white were black. The 
law's prevailing paradigm for achieving racial equality failed 
us then, and it fails us now, because it is not first about the 
eradication of white supremacy.98 
This is especially dangerous for Asian Americans, who have 
been used as a "buffer" between whites and other subordinated 
groupS.99 In this hierarchical structure between different minorities, the 
African American is not directly judged against white society, but is 
measured against a "model minority" Asian American. African 
Americans thus are "monitored" by the Asian American minority 
against the backdrop of both groups' subordination to the "invisible 
An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy (manuscript on file with author). 
97. Lawrence, Foreword, supra note 1, at 835 (1995). According to Lawrence, we 
adopt the belief systems of the dominant white culture. Id. at 829. Thus, our task is to 
"name ourselves (black, Latino/a, Asian, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Japanese, Korean, people 
of color, Mrican diaspora, pan-Asian, colonized, progressive, antiracist) and give those 
names meanings that oppose and undermine white supremacy." Id. at 839. As Lawrence 
states, "it is not just blacks who are injured by stereotypes about blacks, but Latinos and 
Asian and even whites." Id. at 827. 
98. Id. at 826. 
99. See Natsu Saito Jenga, Finding Our Voices, Teaching Our Truth: Reflections on 
Legal Pedagogy and Asian American Identity, 3 UCLA Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 81, 83-84 
(1995) (noting how the "model minority" myth places Asian Americans in a racial 
hierarchy in a "yellow buffer zone" that is "below" European Americans and "above" 
African Americans and LatinolLatinas). 
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majority" of whites and their racial privilege. toO The creation of a tiered 
rather than a binary construction of racial relationships to subordinate 
racial groups is further evidence of the danger of rejecting the 
black/white paradigm without a grounding in antisubordination 
politics. tol As Gotanda points out: 
What should not be forgotten amidst these complexities 
[issues of group and class privilege among people of colorl, 
however, is that interracial and interethnic conflict cannot be 
divorced from the broader American historical context of 
racial subordination. One of the historical axes of social 
subordination in America has been White privilege over 
African Americans. Even as the possibilities of racial 
100. See Neil Gotanda, Multiculturalism and Racial Stratification, in Mapping 
Multiculturalism 238, 240 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter Gotanda, Multiculturalism]. 
101. See Jenga, supra note 99, at 84 (observing that Asian Americans can use this 
"buffer" positioning either to reinforce racial hierarchy or expose and dismantle the 
hierarchy); see also Wu, From Black to White, supra note 86, at 208-09 ("Asian Americans 
become white predominantly for the purpose of attacking affirmative action programs."); 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and 
Reparations, 20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 223, 233 (1992) (posing the question whether 
reparations for Japanese American internees during World War II "enabled society to feel 
better about itself without addressing issues of domination and oppression, power and 
injustice"). John O. Calmore warns that to ignore the fact that the black/white paradigm 
is a historically racialized framework is to risk "being co-opted or converted into token 
honorary white people and, as such, buy into an individualist and assimilationist 
worldview and orientation." John O. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real 
World of Race: An Essay for "Naked People Longing To Swim Free," 15 Law & Ineq. J. 
25, 65 (1997). 
Professor Yamamoto has articulated an analytical framework for understanding 
the operation of dominance and subordination outside the old black/white paradigm 
without sacrificing the primary focus on white supremacy. See Eric K Yamamoto, Critical 
Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 
95 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 891 (1997). According to Professor Yamamoto, situated group power 
involves four understandings: (1) simultaneity (racial group can be viewed as oppressed 
and oppressive simultaneously depending on power relationships involved); (2) 
positionality (focuses on actor's "power position within a given context [to] identify its 
potential as an agent or object of domination, or both"); (3) differentiation (how, within 
a system or context of racial domination "where racial minorities are struggling against 
white domination, a nonwhite racial group acquires and exercises power over another"); 
and (4) dominance/transformation ("The extent of one racial group's power over another 
is determined in part by its alignment with other ... actors."). [d. at 893. Relative power 
"generates racial harms for which the more powerful group bears responsibility." [d. at 
892-93. 
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stratification and the embedded ideological constructions of 
Orientalism are examined, awareness of the continuation of 
that basic axis of power and privilege must continue. 102 
77 
It would be a supreme irony if the effects of moving beyond the 
black/white paradigm by Asian Pacific Americans and other peoples of 
color were that the African American struggles for equality became 
beleaguered on multiple fronts rather than just one. 103 
B. The Corruption ofthe Critique and Anti-Essentialist Rhetoric 
From the Right 
The failure to articulate and proclaim a political agenda in the 
definition of racial identity has allowed a corruption of the critique of 
the bipolar paradigm. The fight against white supremacy has often been 
coopted into a struggle against an inchoate "racism." The Supreme 
Court has used the image of a multicultural society to recast whites as 
just another group competing with many others and to transform them 
into another victimized groUp.104 Indeed, the beginnings of using 
multiminority conflict to assert the rights of whites as if they were no 
different from other minority groups has become the signature of recent 
Supreme Court racial jurisprudence. 105 
102. Gotanda, Multiculturalism, supra note 100, at 246; see also Chang, End of 
Innocence, supra note 1, at 24-25 ("The model minority myth plays a key role in 
establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian Americans while 
simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites."). 
John O. Calmore articulates the continued limited validity of the black/white paradigm 
as "the racialized framework . . . [into whichl certain other groups have been 
incorporated, constructed, and oppressed." Calmore, supra note 101, at 62. 
103. The danger of completely rejecting the applicability of the old black/white 
paradigm raises the apprehension among African Americans that their continued claims 
and interests, historically unaddressed, will be diluted and ignored. Calmore, supra note 
101, at 6l. 
104. See Natapoff, supra note 66, at 1062. 
105. Id. at 1072. NatapoiT writes, "[tlhe Court, capitalizing on the diversity of 
American society, has lifted the stigma from white without addressing the continuing 
pervasiveness of racial discrimination or the increasingly complex implications of a 
multiracial polity." Id. at 1079. She shows, for example, how the O'Connor opinion in 
Richmond v. J.A Croson Co. portrays the situation in Richmond simply as multiple racial 
groups competing as equals for power and wealth, recasting the notion of "minority 
status" as a "temporary numerically inferior presence in a given locale, rather than a 
group subject to historic discrimination and in need of systemic remedy." Natapoff, supra 
note 66, at 1075; see also 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). Natapoff also points out 
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This worldview directly echoes the fears of many whites that 
people of color, particularly African Americans, are economically as 
well-off or are doing better than whites. In a recent national poll, 58% 
of white respondents held the view that blacks had equal or better jobs 
than whites. lOG Only 38% of white respondents thought that racism was 
a significant problem, and 65% of the white respondents saw little 
difference between social and economic conditions of blacks and 
whites. 107 These statistics indicate a fear of whites losing their racial 
hegemony. These fears are compounded by the belief widely held by 
whites that they now make up less than the majority of the U.S. 
population. 108 
that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion recasts "minority" from a historical and political 
notion of a disadvantaged group to an ahistorical numeric phenomenon. N atapoff, supra 
note 66, at 1071. See Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
As N atapoff argues, the Equal Protection Clause is thus seen as directed not against 
white racism but against governmental discrimination. Natapoff, supra note 66, at 1071. 
106. Richard Morin, A Distorted Image of Minorities: Poll Suggests That What 
Whites Think They See May Affect Beliefs, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1995, at AI. The telephone 
poll, conducted by The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard 
University, interviewed 1,970 randomly selected Americans, including 802 whites, 474 
blacks, 352 Asians, and 252 Latinos. The survey found that 46% of whites felt that blacks 
had jobs of equal quality to those of whites, 6% said blacks had jobs that were "a little 
better" than whites, and 6% stated that blacks held jobs that were "a lot better." 
107. Id. Indeed, according to the same survey, the majority of the middle class white 
respondents believed blacks were economically on par with whites in terms of jobs (51%), 
access to health care (54%), and opportunities for education (62%). Kevin Merida, Worry, 
Frustration Build for Many in Black Middle Class, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1995, at AI. 
108. Priscilla Labovitz, Immigration-Just the Facts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1996, at 
A15. While the actual percentage of white population in the United States is 74%, whites 
believe the percentage is under 49.9%. While the actual figure for blacks is about 12%, 
the white estimation is about 24%. Id. It is also striking to note that two of the five 
countries from which the highest number of undocumented immigrants emigrate to New 
York City are European. Id. On the other hand, after the year 2050, blacks, Asians, 
Latinos, and Native Americans will probably attain a majority. See, e.g., Brad 
Edmondson, The Minority Majority in 2001, Am. Demographics, Oct. 1996, at 16; Ramon 
G. McLeod, Census Shows a Turning Point-Hispanics Increasing the Fastest, S.F. Chron., 
Mar. 27, 1996, at A14 (citing a 1996 U.S. Census Bureau report estimating that at some 
point in the 21st century the non-Hispanic white population will be a minority). 
Moreover, fears that immigration is producing economic hardship for the United 
States are questionable. Immigration adds approximately $10 billion to the American 
economy due to an increased labor supply and decreased prices. See Robert Pear, 
Academy's Report Says Immigration Benefits the U.S., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1997, at AI. 
Any negative effects such as depressed wages or increased competition for low wage jobs 
are "relatively small." Id. Moreover, "immigration does not have a decisive influence on 
the economic opportunities of blacks." Id. at A24. While in such states as New Jersey and 
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The careful protection of white interests in an increasingly 
multicultural society has become the equal protection doctrinal coin of 
the realm. In Shaw v. Reno,109 where the Court struck down a North 
Carolina reapportionment plan to create two districts in which African 
American voters were a majority, the Court based its decision on an 
assumption that race was an attribute independent of political 
orientation. 110 Since, the Court reasoned, the assumption that 
individuals of a particular race had common political views was an 
"impermissible stereotype," racial redistricting constituted a 
circumstance "antithetical" to representative democracy.l1l However, as 
a threshold matter, the fiction that race-even if defined narrowly and 
solely as skin color-is unrelated to political orientation is wrong from 
a descriptive standpoint.112 Political orientation and worldview are 
component parts of shared racial identity.113 More important, from a 
normative standpoint, the Court has it backwards. If race definition is 
partly an articulation of defined societal and political attitudes, the 
premise upon which the Shaw decision is founded is without any 
reality-both descriptively as well as normatively.114 
Moreover, the consequence of the failure to ground the 
discussion of racial identity in the context of white supremacy has 
allowed room for the expression of neoconservative viewpoints to be 
expressed in anti-essentialist as well as nonbipolar terms in other 
California immigration may account for some increased taxes, this is offset by 
immigrants' helping to "pay the public costs of the aging baby boom generation." [d. Thus, 
"the vast majority of Americans are enjoying a healthier economy" as a result of 
immigration. [d. at A1. 
109. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
110. [d. at 647. The Court opined that a reapportionment plan that created a district 
whose inhabitants had "little in common with one another but the color of their skin" 
reinforced a perception that members of the same racial group "think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." [d. 
111. [d. at 647-48. 
112. In his dissent, Justice Stevens cogently pointed out that politicians rely on 
assumptions that people in particular groups vote in particular ways, that it is possible 
to allege and show that white majorities vote as a bloc, and that "pervasive racial bloc 
voting" is a real phenomenon. [d. at 678 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
113. See supra notes 32-41,18-24 and accompanying text. 
114. One need only remember the old civil rights term of "Uncle Tom" or the 1970s 
Asian American epithet of "banana" ("yellow on the outside-white on the inside") to 
understand how worldview played an important part of defining one's racial identity. 
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contexts.1I5 Such viewpoints are apparent in the recent Hopwood 
decision rendered by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. lIs Ruling in a 
challenge brought by four white applicants, the Hopwood court held the 
University of Texas School of Law's admission policy unconstitutional. 
That policy evaluated African American and Mexican American 
candidates differently so as to admit a class comparable to those 
graduating from Texas undergraduate institutions.ll7 The court ruled 
against that policy despite the indisputable fact, acknowledged by the 
Fifth Circuit, that the law school had historically discriminated against 
African Americans. The court made the implicit admission that even 
some members of the law school faculty and administration may have 
remained from that era. liS 
What is particularly relevant is how the Fifth Circuit 
characterized racial diversity. It saw it as "simply [achieving] a student 
body that looks different," concluding that, "[s]uch a criterion is no more 
rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical 
size or blood type of applicants.,,119 The court used anti-essentialist 
language to justify its approach decrying the assumption that racial 
115. See Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1573 (1996). Volpp names the phenomenon in the 
academic environment as "backlash scholarship." [d. at 1575. Backlash scholarship 
"attempts to preempt debate on the difficult questions raised by such subjects as 
multiculturalism and race" by employing four strategies: denying that scholarship such 
as critical race scholarship exists; asserting that such scholarship is invalid as 
scholarship; redefining or appropriating "key imagery, terms and tropes that are distorted 
and redeployed in the service of what has been named 'meritocratic fundamentalism"'; 
and misrepresenting previous literature. [d. at 1575. 
116. See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub 
nom, Thurgood Marshall Legal Society v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). 
117. [d. at 934. 
118. [d. at 953 ("The vast majority of the facuity, staff, and students at the law 
school had absolutely nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school practiced 
in the past."). 
119. [d. at 945. Other than the simplistic biological definition of race explicitly 
suggested by the Fifth Circuit, it is striking that even on its own terms, the Fifth Circuit 
cannot see that the change from a historically monochromatic student body to one where 
there is merely a diversity of appearance would constitute a sea change in the context of 
the atmosphere and dynamics of the University of Texas. Indeed, the preliminary post-
Hopwood admissions numbers at the University of Texas Law School indicate that black 
students admittees dropped from 5.9% to 0.7% and Latino admittees dropped from 6.3% 
to under 2.3%. Ellis Cose, The Color Bind, Newsweek, May 12, 1997, at 58. 
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characteristics implied anything about thought or behavior. 120 By 
ignoring the social and political implications of racial intercourse, the 
Hopwood court was forced to return to defining race as merely a 
circumstance of skin color-a standard rejected seventy-five years ago 
by the Supreme Court. 121 
The use of anti-essentialist language to discredit progressive 
racial identification occurs in contexts other than lawsuits. In his attack 
on "racial fundamentalism," Professor Jim Chen posits a "creole 
republic" in which racial discourse cannot be reduced to two ethnic 
blacklwhite poles. 122 Indeed, he makes the undeniable observation that 
"[r]ace, as a human category, has no biological significance at all.,,123 As 
Chen himself so aptly demonstrates in his own words, "[l]ooks do not 
equal voice.,,124 
Thus, the poverty of Chen's position lies not in the descriptive, 
but in the political assumptions upon which his conclusions rest. He 
recounts a story in which Asian American students viewed him with 
suspicion when he applied for a position at Boalt Hall <the University 
of California at Berkeley School of Law), because he balked at the 
"bitter coolie labor" he would be asked to perform by serving as their 
120. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the 
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 12 
(1974». 
121. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (rejecting skin color as 
"impracticable" for determining race since there were some whites darker than "persons 
of the brown or yellow races"); see also Gotanda, A Critique, supra note 1, at 30 n.119 
(discussing Ozawa and the Court's rejection of skin color in determining who was a 
"white person"). I also discuss this irony in the context of another article. See Chris 
lijima, Swimming From The Island of the Colorblind: Deserting an Ill-Conceived 
Constitutional Metaphor, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 583 (1997). 
122. Chen, supra note 63, at 155, 160. Chen's assertion of his "right" to marry 
whomever he wants irrespective of racial considerations lies at the heart of his 
analysis-as if his personal choice of partner had anything substantive to do with a 
political critique of white supremacist ideology. For a comprehensive critique of Chen's 
article by a number of scholars and Chen's response, see Colloquy, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 
1427-1628 (1997). 
Moreover, as Professor Leonard Baynes reminds us, people of Mrican ancestry 
are not of pure Mrican ancestry, multiracial unions took place in a racially-subordinate 
context, and that regardless of hue and mixed race ancestry, blacks have been always 
categorized as black. Leonard M. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough For You? An Analysis Of 
the Northwestern University Law School's Struggle over Minority Faculty Hiring, 2 Mich. 
J. Race & Law 205, 215 (1997) [hereinafter Baynes, Who Is Black Enough?). 
123. Chen, supra note 63, at 162. 
124. Id. at 155. 
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role model. 125 He complains that the students would "scrutinize [his] 
political beliefs" in their search for an "authentic" Asian American role 
model. 126 
Indeed, Chen's politics are at the heart of his "authenticity." He 
assumes that white supremacy has no pervasive impact on nonwhites, 
that it is neither permanent nor predominant and that to suggest that 
people of color cannot attain equal justice within traditional channels 
is "racialist dogma.,,127 The heart of my disagreement with those like 
Chen and Clarence Thomas lies not with their critiques of an 
essentialist racial definition, but with their political analysis of the 
effects of racism in American society on people of color. 
The failure of people of color to articulate racial identity in 
political terms confuses issues of racial diversity in other contexts. 
Professor Maria O'Brien Hylton, a woman of white Australian and 
Black Cuban ancestry, applied for a teaching position at Northwestern 
University Law School in 1995. Her appointment was opposed by, 
among others, Professor Joyce Hughes, an African American law 
professor, on the basis that irrespective of her phenotype Hylton should 
not be considered a "Black candidate" since African American students 
should "benefit from persons on the faculty who validate them.,,128 
However, the underlying issue was not, in essence, phenotype or even 
ancestral background, but the political content of the appointment. The 
hesitation on the part of the students of color who opposed her 
appointment was not on phenotype grounds but on the political grounds 
that she was unwilling to identify herself expressly as a candidate of 
color. 129 
125. Id. at 148. Chen describes how Asian students inquired into his willingness to 
be a role model and mentor and how he soon realized that "no mountain of gold, no 
purchase of academic prestige could serve as adequate wages for the bitter labor I would 
be asked to perform." Id. (footnotes omitted). He actually goes on to define this "bitter 
labor" as "coolie" labor. Id. at 148 n.2l. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 155. 
128. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough?, supra note 122, at 227. Professor Baynes's 
article discusses the circumstances of the Hylton controversy from the perspective of the 
inadequacy of an essentialist position in opposing Professor Hylton's candidacy. Id. at 
209. 
129. Baynes points out that the thread of the student complaints about O'Brien 
Hylton "was the fear that Northwestern would consider [her] a 'minority' appointment 
... and then feel less pressure to hire minorities and women in the future." Id. at 212. 
Student leaders stated that "[t]here's a lot more to this than black people supporting each 
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Leonard Baynes points out that the "Black enough" ancestry 
litmus test that was proposed by Hughes was unworkable; it could not 
coherently evaluate the ability of a candidate of color to bring diversity 
to the institution. l3o According to Baynes, "Black enough" must include 
mentoring students of color, serving as role models to communities of 
color, and discussing with colleagues issues and attitudes negatively 
affecting people of color. l3l These are political criteria-a de facto 
political litmus test-and there is no constructive purpose served by 
shrinking from the implications of that debate. l32 Communities of color 
must define the content oftheir own identity, and the decision of who 
brings "racial diversity" to an institution must be made by 
representatives of the community with a voice in harmony with their 
interests. Thus, in an affirmative action context it must be students, 
faculty, and representatives of the larger community of color that have 
input into the screening and hiring of all candidates. They must be 
given significant and major influence with respect to those of color. 
Without such influence students will be increasingly faced with 
Clarence Thomases, perhaps ancestrally "Black enough" but woefully 
inadequate from any progressive community perspective. l33 As Angela 
Y. Davis explains: 
[I] cannot resist the temptation to evoke Clarence Thomas. 
Not that I claim a relationship with Clarence Thomas, even 
though we are racially marked in the same way and to a 
certain extent share a common historical culture. For 
example, he claims a relationship with Malcolm X. So do I. He 
claims a relationship to the Black Panther Party. So do I. But 
there is a political demarcation that defines my relationship 
other simply because our skins match." Rohan Preston, Battle to Keep Black Professor 
Leaves Bruised Egos and Reputations, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1995, at B8 (quoting Sean T. 
Carter, then-president of the Northwestern Black Law Students Association). Monica 
Santiago, then-co-president of the Hispanic Law Students Association, was quoted as 
saying that the "concern was that, if you're not trying to present yourself as a minority 
candidate, what does that tell us about you? The total picture was not good." Id. 
130. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough?, supra note 122, at 231-32. 
131. Id. at 225. 
132. In a previous article, I discussed the use of surrogate fictions in the context of 
jury deliberations. Fictions are used by juries to get around the real underlying issues of 
justice that the jury wishes to discuss but is disabled from considering by the jury 
instructions. David Dorfman & Chris Iijima, Fact, Fictions, and Forgiveness: Jury 
Nullification in a New Context, 28 Mich. J.L. Ref. 86 (1995). 
133. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough?, supra note 122. 
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to that political culture in a way that is very different from 
his. Cultures are not politically neutral. A multiculturalism 
that does not acknowledge the political character of culture 
will not, I am sure, lead toward the dismantling of racist, 
sexist, homophobic, economically exploitative institutions. 134 
[29:47 
Thus, the notion of "diversity" as simply describing an apolitical 
divergence of views about the "conceptions of life,,,135 and not 
implicating shifts of power relationships within institutions, is not 
limited to courts. Moreover, this uni-dimensional view of race and power 
relationships in society, exhibited by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood or 
the Supreme Court in Shaw cannot be attributed solely to a failure of 
the black/white paradigm to address the complexities of racial life in 
American society. It is a reflection of the general society's articulation 
of assumptions and conclusions that have been infected by an inability 
or an unwillingness to consider any perspective different from the 
"norm." 
C. The Danger of Pragmatically Appealing To the "Middle" 
Some scholars approach racial politics as a matter of 
pragmatism and tactics. There has been a recent suggestion to 
articulate race issues in a way to win over the "political middle.,,136 This 
134. Angela Y. Davis, Gender, Class, Multiculturalism, Rethinking "Race" Politics 
in Mapping Multiculturalism 40, 47 (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 1996). 
135. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. 
136. Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability 
of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1996). 
Professor Kang expressly asks how affirmative action programs can be done in a manner 
"that will garner support from the political middle and a post-Adarand Supreme Court." 
Id. at 47. According to Kang, a defense of affirmative action should not rely "too heavily 
on a rhetoric of victim and oppressor groups, which regardless of its merits fails to 
persuade the political middle." Id. at 21. 
While I disagree with Professor Kang's approach, his orientation toward 
effecting real change in the context of certain political realities is highly instructive. 
Indeed, an important strategic question is how to persuade the middle to come to a more 
progressive political view. Perhaps where we differ is in our definitions of who, what, and 
where the middle is, and from where real change will come. I believe it will come not from 
the winning over of a Justice who has made her views on "colorblind" racial jurisprudence 
clear, but from a change in society's political understanding and consensus. Moreover, 
and unhappily, I confess that while I may be critical of Professor Kang's insightful 
attempt to bring racial justice into greater focus, I bring no immediate practical 
alternative solution to the discussion except the broad admonition that the primary focus 
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pragmatism is fundamentally different from a support by people of color 
for a discourse about legal rights. While ultimately unsatisfying from a 
long range political standpoint since it lends support to the notion that 
law is fixed and determinate, discourse about legal rights is 
nevertheless an important weapon in the arsenal of subordinated people 
because it lends moral and political legitimacy to the struggle for 
equality.137 On the other hand, naked political pragmatism cannot hold 
out a transformative vision of a different society. illtimately, it may 
reinforce the very preconceptions that the dominant culture has 
imposed. 
Under one such pragmatic approach, issues like affirmative 
action are viewed from an analytic framework in which the "individual 
has the right not to suffer disadvantage from a governmental practice 
that conveys an objective social meaning of stigma.,,138 Under this 
should be on political organizing and education. Professor Kang has made a real 
contribution to this process with his work on affirmative action. See infra notes 139-40 
and accompanying text. 
137. One of the areas in which Critical Race Theory differs from Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) is that CLS tends to downplay the notion oflegal rights as "one of the ways 
that law helps to legitimize the social world by representing it as rationally mediated by 
the rule oflaw." Crenshaw et a!., Introduction, in Critical Race Theory, supra note 1, at 
xxiii. However, for Critical Race Theory: 
[Rlights discourse held a social and transformative value in the 
context of racial subordination that transcended the narrower 
question of whether reliance on rights could alone bring about any 
determinate results .... [Tlhe very notion of a subordinate people 
exercising rights was an important dimension of Black empowerment 
during the civil rights movement, significant not simply because of 
the occasional legal victories that were garnered, but because of the 
trans formative dimension of Mrican-Americans re-imagining 
themselves as full, rights-bearing citizens within the American 
political imagination. 
Id. at xxiii-iv. 
138. Kang, supra note 136, at 24. Professor Kang poses a "banned meanings" test 
and notes that Justice O'Connor has applied an objective social meaning construct to 
First Amendment issues in which she asks whether an objective observer would consider 
the law to "convey a message of endorsement." He also notes that she has applied such 
an approach to race issues as well by "analogizing the question of whether an objective 
observer will interpret a governmental action as endorsement to 'the question whether 
racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message.'" [d. at 28 (citing 
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis in original). He also notes that in O'Connor's First Amendment 
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framework the court must consider the issues from the different parties' 
perspectives and then attempt to reconcile the viewpoints. l39 
An attempt to ground the Court's approach in the consideration 
of equal protection issues from a multi-perspectived position makes a 
valuable contribution to equal protection analysis jurisprudence. The 
problem is whether courts-and in particular, the Supreme Court-are 
able to understand issues from perspectives uninfected by their own 
unconscious racial attitudes and ideology.l40 Indeed, the assumption 
that "it is hard to argue that affirmative action conveys the objective 
social meaning that whites-because they are white-deserve society's 
antipathy or indifference"l4l is belied by the fact that the Supreme 
Court itself, by recasting whites as another potentially victimized group 
in a multicultural environment, has already signaled that as its view. l42 
endorsement theory the analysis is from the perspective of a "reasonable third-party 
observer," while under Kang's "banned meanings" approach to equal protection analysis, 
the responsibility is placed upon an "empathic" court. [d. at 29, 31. 
139. [d. at 42. It is worth comparing the approach by Charles Lawrence in his 
"cultural meaning test" since it appears similar to Kang's "banned meanings" approach 
in that each focuses on perceptions of governmental actions in terms of their implied 
racial content. Charles R. Lawrence III, The [d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 356 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The 
[d]. 
First, Lawrence tries to address, albeit inconclusively, the dilemma of 
determining from whose perspective racial meaning should or can be derived when 
cultural meanings conflict. [d. at 379 n.293. Lawrence concedes that accepting the 
dominant culture's determinations of racial meaning may be problematic since "the 
minority subculture may well see the dominant culture more clearly than the dominant 
culture sees itself." In those cases, the meaning of governmental action may be better 
evaluated from the perspective of the subgroup affected. [d. Lawrence explicitly does not 
apply his cultural meaning test in the context of affirmative action since the test 
measures racial meaning in circumstances where there is facial neutrality, whereas in 
affirmative action, the racial component is "evident." [d. at 379 n.294. Lawrence's 
purpose may be different from Kang's in that Lawrence concerns himself with 
articulating a more sophisticated approach to the issue of unconscious racism within 
equal protection doctrine. [d. at 387. Kang, on the other hand, focuses on an analytic 
framework for equal protection analysis within the context of affirmative action. 
140. Kang, supra note 136, at 32 (admitting that examples of opinions incorporating 
empathic reasoning by certain Justices "do not prove that the individuals who constitute 
our federal and state judiciary are especially empathic persons"). 
141. [d. at 45. 
142. See Natapoff, supra note 66, at 1062. In fact, the prevailing ideology behind the 
recent California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209) is precisely that whites are a 
victimized racial group. See, e.g., Jesse L. Jackson, 1995 Symposium Statement, 38 How. 
L.J. 449, 456 ("Clearly, an economically anxious and frightened population, cruelly 
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As Charles Lawrence points out, racism can be "well-intentioned" and 
unconscious. 143 He reminds us that: 
Judges are not immune from our culture's racism, nor can 
they escape the psychological mechanisms that render us all, 
to some extent, unaware of our racist beliefs .... Judges 
continue to come primarily from elite white backgrounds. 
They undoubtably share the values and perceptions of that 
subculture, which may well be insensitive or even antagonistic 
toward the values, needs, and experiences of blacks and other 
minorities. 144 
Thus, faith in the courts' ability to go beyond their own 
"colorblindness" to address issues of race from a perspective that will 
account for the conscious and unconscious, historic and continuing 
effects of white supremacy may well be naive and ultimately, disarming. 
The Supreme Court itself has signaled the jurisprudential legitimacy of 
the assault against the interests of people of color. Whatever the 
ultimate analytical framework, the Court's decisions are rooted in 
political assumptions about how power is allocated, perpetuated, and 
gained. 
manipulated to believe that their troubles are caused by job losses to African Americans, 
Latinos and women, will more than likely vote against affirmative action and against 
racial justice and gender equality." (referring to Proposition 209)). For a comprehensive 
view of Asian Pacific Americans and affirmative action see Chin et aI., Beyond Self 
Interest, supra note 27. 
143. See Lawrence, The [d, supra note 139. He notes: 
[R]acially prejudiced behavior that is actually the product of learned 
cultural preferences is experienced as a reflection of rational 
deduction from objective experience, which is nonprejudiciai behavior. 
The decision maker who is unaware of the selective perception that 
has produced her stereotype will not view it as a stereotype. 
rd. at 339. 
144. [d. at 380. 
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CONCLUSION 
The construction of racial identity is a fluid process. More 
fundamentally, it is a political one. Discussions of racial diversity often 
have focused upon attributes of racial identity and described the 
complexity of its definition, but have avoided the harder question of the 
ultimate importance of it. Perhaps, given the conservative drift of the 
country in general, the fear of "political correctness" labels has driven 
this debate underground. Surrogate terms such as ancestry or role 
modeling have replaced the more explicit terms of debate. But it is time 
for people of color to reclaim the racial vocabulary and to reframe the 
construction and discussion of racial identity back where it belongs-as 
a means of politically organizing ourselves. Indeed, it is either a 
function of irony or denial that those on the right who decry "political 
correctness" so often fail to acknowledge in their self-righteousness the 
political orthodoxy and catch-phrases of the right, such as "traditional 
values" or "colorblindness." Moreover, those who would decry the 
construction of racial identity in the political interest of subordinated 
people conveniently forget or disregard that racial categories 
themselves were a political construction imposed upon people of color 
in the first instance. 
But racial identity cannot be discussed, much less understood, 
without undertaking an analysis of what politically serves subordinate 
races, the poor and the powerless in society. This Article advocates no 
particular solution and no particular "party line." On the contrary, the 
struggle among various viewpoints will raise the general level of 
understanding. But it does suggest that we need to engage each other 
in political and ideological debate within, among, and without races 
about what having a just and fair society means and how best to 
achieve it. Irrespective of how the process and results are depicted by 
the larger society, people of color must control the definition of our own 
racial identity. The construction of racial identity cannot be done solely 
in the confines of the mind or the classroom or the pages of academic 
articles. We will forge our identities in the new millennium in the 
crucible of concrete struggle with the burning issues of the day. 
Finally, progressive political dire~tion and agenda are at the 
heart of racial identification. Repairing the division between and 
understanding the commonality within and among races will be 
achieved primarily not by academics constructing or even 
understanding categories of color or culture. It will be through learning 
the lessons history teaches about the construction of racial identity and 
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in heeding the activist direction in which history points. Most 
fundamentally, it will be by defining ourselves in the process of taking 
a stand for the interests of the vast majority of people who have little 
time to read learned thoughts, but have daily cause to worry about their 
children's future. 
